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I. INTRODUCTION
Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc.I was a class action suit by
citizen groups seeking damages and a modification of a consent decree between
a State and a polluter. Satsky is significant because the facts leading up to the
suit are typical2 of many environmental disputes.3 Two years after a consent
decree was adopted, a class action suit was brought by citizens, recreation
businesses along the Eagle River, and sport fishing associations for damages to
their livelihoods and economic losses. 4 The "[p]laintiffs believe 'the consent
decree is not worth the paper it's written on... [because i]t hasn't solved the
problem' of contamination from the Eagle mine."5 They claimed that years of
mining and the remediation activities polluted the Eagle River and caused their
injuries. 6 They sought $300 million in damages and indirectly demanded
modification of the consent decree. 7
Part II of this Case Comment details the pertinent facts of Satsky. Part H
1 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
2 Following three years of negotiations, the State of Colorado and Paramount entered
into a consent decree requiring Paramount to pay fines and remediate the site and
surrounding areas. Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1467.
3 The case is significant because a majority of environmental actions result in consent
decrees, and this case undermines the value of those decrees. The significance is evidenced
by the fact that the Attorneys General of 10 states (California, Colorado, Kansas, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming), as well as the
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Colorado Trial Lawyers Association, filed
amicus curiae briefs with the court of appeals. Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1466.
4 The business-plaintiffs are Eagle River White Water, Inc., Mark C. Lokay, also
known as Vail Fishing Guides, Gore Creek Flyfisherman, Inc., and Beaver Creek Flyfisher.
These plaintiffs sued in a class action on their own behalf and as representatives of a class of
similarly situated individuals and businesses. Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1464. The class is estimated
to include about 2000 citizens and 2000 businesses. Paramount Argues Eagle Mine Suit
Barred by Earlier Final Judgment in Superfund Case, 5 Tonics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at
1041 (Jan. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Paramount Argues Eagle Mine Suit].
5 Paramount Argues Eagle Mine Suit, supra note 4, at 1041 (quoting the plaintiffs'
attorney Herbert DeLap).
6Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1467.
7 Paramount Argues Eagle Mine Suit, supra note 4, at 1041.
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discusses consent decrees and the role they play in environmental policy. Part
IV then discusses the effects Satsky has on the consent decree and suggests that,
in Satsky and similar cases, laches should bar plaintiffs to the extent that they
ask the court to use its equity powers to modify the consent decree. Part V
analyzes Satsky as a de facto untimely intervention claim. By applying
principles used when analyzing untimely intervention claims to Satsky, further
reasons exist to bar the modification request. Finally, Part VI discusses res
judicata and parens patriae standing as they relate to consent decrees between
the government and private defendants. Part VI then examines the difficulty of
applying res judicata in cases like Satsky where some of the citizen plaintffs'
claims are purely private, some are entirely in the public interest, and most lie
somewhere on the continuum between these two extremes.
As this Case Comment will illustrate, Satsky raises an infinite number of
issues that have no simple answers. The purpose of the Case Comment is to
apprise the reader of the complex issues that exist when citizens sue a private
party on the same transaction that was the subject of a prior judgment between
that defendant and the government.
I. FACTS AND ISSUES IN SATSKY
The Eagle Mine was operated between 1916 and 1981.8 The mining
activities contaminated the Eagle River with lead, zinc, and several other heavy
metals. 9 In 1983 the State of Colorado instituted a suit which included claims
of CERCLA10 violations, common law and statutory nuisance, strict liability in
tort, and negligence."1 During negotiation of a consent decree, Colorado
represented to Gulf + Western that it believed it was entitled to recover
damages as trustee for injured citizens.12 Colorado also filed a report that
8 Gulf + Western, Inc. operated the mine for a majority of this period. In 1983
Paramount Communications, Inc. merged with Gulf + Western, Inc. and succeeded as
owner of the Eagle Mine. Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1466. The State of Colorado instituted the
action that resulted in the consent decree against Gulf + Western, Inc. Id. at 1467.
9 The other contaminants include antimony, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium,
mercury, nickel, silver, thallium, and uranium. Id. at 1467 n.3.
10 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
11 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1467.
12 Answer Brief of Appellee Paramount Communications, Inc., at 21, Satsky, (No. 92-
1037). The interrogatory asked:
Do you contend that any parcel of real property has been reduced in value by the
alleged release of hazardous substances involved in this action and, if so, identify the
parcel of property involved, the owner, and the amount of reduction....
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sought to "quantif[y] damages to local residents of Eagle County, Colorado and
to non-residents .... "13 Paramount was unsuccessful in a motion to exclude
the State's report 14 and thus, Paramount was forced to pay for damages to
citizens and private property under the consent decree approved by the district
court in 1988. The consent decree also embodied a plan for Paramount to clean
wastes from the mine and surrounding areas.' 5 In 1990 the Satsky class action
suit was filed seeking, among other things, 16 CERCLA response costs,
punitive damages, and an injunction barring any further releases of hazardous
materials. 17 The plaintiffs relied on claims of CERCLA violations, negligence,
strict liability, nuisance, trespass, and misrepresentation. 18
[The State replied:]
Yes. The state presently believes that property adjacent to the Eagle River in the
Mintum area has been reduced in value, but the state has not yet determined the amount
of this injury. With regard to property value outside of the Mintum area, the state has
not yet determined whether any injury was [sic] occurred. Jfthe state does determine
that an injury has occurred, the state believes it is entitled to recover as trustee from
defendants for he injury.
Id. at 21-22.
13 Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).
14 Id. at 23-24.
15 Consent Decree, Order, Judgment and Reference to Special Master, State of
Colorado v. Gulf + Western, Inc., No. 83-C-2387 (D. Colo. 1988). In the consent decree,
Paramount agreed to clean up wastes in the mine, at five dumping sites, and along the Eagle
River. Paramount also paid the State of Colorado $1.7 million in natural resource damages,
$1.75 million for State response costs and a 15-year remedial action plan, $1.1 million for
continued State oversight, and $250,000 to clean the Eagle River; and executed a $500,000
letter of credit for future environmental remediation. Fraud Claim Against Colorado Mine
Proceeds; Six Otlr Counts Barred Under Res Judicata, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 29, at
861 (Dec. 18, 1991).
16 Plaintiffs claimed injuries include:
property damage, diminution of value to real estate, loss of income and other economic
losses including loss of asset value, increased operating expenses, increased cost of
personal protection from contaminated domestic water or the threat of contaminated
domestic water, loss of water quality or quantity, loss of enjoyment of real property,
mental anguish, and emotional distress and an increased risk of harm and an increased
risk of contracting fatal or otherwise serious illnesses.
Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1470 (quoting plaintiffs' second amended complaint).
17 Id. at 1467.
18 Id. This Case Comment does not consider the misrepresentation claim in the class
action suit because it stems from the consent decree itself, and there is no question that the
consent decree cannot act as a bar on that claim.
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The issue in Satsky was whether the citizens, suing on claims similar to
those already addressed by the State, were barred by the res judicata effect of
the consent decree. The district court granted summary judgment for
Paramount on all the plaintiffs' claims with the exception of the
misrepresentation claim. 19 The court held that the citizens' claims sought
"essentially the same damages and injunctive relief as were sought in
Paramount I."20 The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, holding
that "[tlo the extent these claims involve injuries to purely private interests,
which the State cannot raise, then the claims are not barred. By 'purely private
interests,' we mean claims that the State has no standing to raise. "21
III. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSENT DECREES
AND THEIR ROLE IN ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE
Consent decrees22 are the result of negotiations and have characteristics of
19 Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 511-12 (D. Colo.
1991), rev'd, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993).
20 Id. at 511. The courts in the Satsky case have referred to the action between the
State and Paramount that resulted in the consent decree as Paramount I, and to the class
action suit as Paramount H. Aside from the fraud claim, the district court held that "[tlhe
only discernibly different relief sought is for medical detection and surveillance services to
study adverse health effects to the Plaintiffs .... " Id. The court then noted "that health
studies performed for the Paramount I litigation concluded that there was no threat to
human health and the RAP [Remedial Action Plan] incorporated in the Consent Decree
provided for extensive containment, clean-up, and monitoring of the mine site and
surrounding water supplies." Id. The court also found that while no claim for trespass was
brought in Paramount I, one could have been brought, and thus, under res judicata, the
plaintiffs in Satsky were barred from raising that claim. The court went on to say that "[tihe
damages caused by intrusion of hazardous substances from the Eagle Mine onto the
surrounding property were considered in the Consent Decree," and found that the trespass
claim was simply "another way of stating a claim for damages that were addressed in the
Paramount I Consent Decree." Id.
21 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1470.
2 2 Consent decrees vary widely in form and content, but the key feature of a consent
decree is that the underlying issues of the dispute are not resolved in an adversarial
courtroom proceeding. 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4443, at 383 (1981). The term "consent decree" can be used synonymously
with "consent judgment," but "consent judgment" is occasionally used when referring to an
agreement involving only monetary damages. Timothy K. Webster, Protecting
Environmental Consent Decreesfrom Third Party Challenges, 10 VA. ENVrL. L.T. 137, 140
(1990). For the purposes of this Case Comment it makes no difference whether the remedy
embodied in the agreement is equitable, monetary, or a combination of the two.
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both contracts23 and judgments. 24 Because the consent decree is a contract, it
can be enforced upon contract theories in the court that approved it, which is
also the court most familiar with the case. This route of enforcement results in
quick issuance of judicial orders because the court typically does not need to
inquire about past proceedings and activities or the intent of the parties who
entered the decree.25
Because consent decrees are also considered judgments, they have
preclusive effects on the parties and their privies.2 6 There is general agreement
that the extent of preclusion should be based upon the intent of the parties to be
bound by the consent decree.27 The judgmental aspect of consent decrees
played a significant role in Satsky. Paramount argued that the citizens were
23 mhe judgment results from a basically contractual agreement of the parties. It can
be entered only if the parties have in fact agreed to entry, it is to be enforced in accord
with the intent of the parties, and it can be vacated according to basically contractual
principles of fraud, ignorance, mistake, or mutual breach.
18 WRIGHT LiT AL., supra note 22, § 4443, at 383; see also Local Number 93 Int'l Ass'n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986).
24 "A consent decree... is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be
reflected in and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally
applicable to other judgments and decrees." Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1468 (quoting Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757 (1992), which held that consent decrees
are subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), the rule governing "a final judgment,
order, or proceeding").
This Case Comment gives only cursory coverage to consent decrees. For more in-
depth analysis of consent decrees and environmental actions, see generally Robert V.
Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental
Policy Making, 1987 U. CHL LEGAL F. 327.
25 Other advantages of consent decrees include the following:
First,... disputes settled by consent decree are subject to the continuing oversight and
interpretation of a single court. Second, enforcement of a consent decree does not
require the filing of a second lawsuit to establish the validity of the settlement
agreement. Third, a consent decree provides a "more flexible repertoire of enforcement
measures." Fourth, consent decrees lower the costs of enforcing settlements by
channeling any consequent disputes into a single forum (the court that issued the decree)
and reduce the parties' risks of inconsistent duties. Fifth, consent decrees "also facilitate
the monitoring of compliance after the decree is entered." Finally, because consent
decrees are subject to continuing judicial oversight, they may be adjusted by the issuing
court in order to account for changed circumstances.
John R. Thomas, Note, United States v. Fisher: "Posner's Dilemma" and the Uncertain
Triumph of Outcome over Process, 21 ENVrL. L. 427, 434-35 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
26 See infra part VI.
27 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 4443, at 384.
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parties to the consent decree because they were in privity with the State, and
were barred from suing because it was the intent of the State and Paramount to
resolve the matter once and for all.28 The plaintiffs, on the other hand,
contended that the consent decree was not a judgment, and that even if it was,
it could not bind citizens solely because it was entered by a government
official. 29
Consent decrees play a significant role in environmental disputes.3 0
Allowing experts and attorneys to work out a consent decree rather than
contesting every last figure and data point has several advantages over
litigation. First, there is more flexibility in negotiations than in a courtroom
battle because the parties are willing to compromise and to reach a result that
satisfies both sides.31 Second, in environmental disputes, the parties have an
inherent understanding of the technical and policy issues involved. This deeper
28 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1467.
29 Id.
30 For example, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(1)(A) (1988), referring to settlements under
CERCLA, provides:
Whenever the President enters into an agreement under this section with any potentially
responsible party with respect to remedial action under section 9606 of this title,
following approval of the agreement by the Attorney General, except as otherwise
provided in the case of certain administrative settlements referred to in [42 U.S.C.
§ 9622(g)], the agreement shall be entered in the appropriate United States district court
as a consent decree.
Id.
The EPA (acting through the Army Corps of Engineers) does not have the financial
resources to perform site assessments and health studies and then implement a remedial
action plan at every hazardous waste site. Thus, a consent decree is preferred because it
contractually places the responsibility for the investigations, cleanup activities, and expenses
on the polluter, and the EPA is left to oversee the cleanup and take action when the consent
decree is breached. See Thomas, supra note 25, at 429-30.
31 The United States Supreme Court has noted that:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has
produced agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the
issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable
risk of litigation. Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise;
in exchange for the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each give up
something they might have won had they proceeded with the litigation.... The parties
have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as
much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power
and the skill to achieve.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971) (footnote omitted).
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understanding compels the parties to balance the costs and benefits of a myriad
of solutions and come up with what is arguably an ideal solution. On the other
hand, there is a possibility that a judge who lacks any formal scientific training
will impose a solution that is anything but ideal under the circumstances. 32
Thus, in environmental disputes, combining the flexibility of a consent decree
with the inherent familiarity of the parties usually results in a solution that both
the regulator and the regulated can live with.33 Third, consent decrees define
the rights and responsibilities of the defendant. 34 As the negotiators address the
substantive issues and details of implementing the solution, they incorporate the
negotiated terms into the consent decree. Both parties can then point to the
consent decree as binding on their rights and obligations when a subsequent
conflict arises. 35 For these and various other reasons, when it comes to
environmental disputes, there are strong incentives to negotiate and settle in a
consent decree rather than litigate.36
32 See LAWRENCE S. BAcow & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONm ENAL DisPuTE
RFSOLUTION 18-19 (1984). When the factfinding process in techno-trials is left to a lay jury,
the chances that an ideal solution will ultimately result are even more remote. See generally
PEER W. HUBER, GALiLEO'S RFvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 111-29 (1991)
(noting how the inconsistent verdicts in several jury trials coupled with the uncertainty of
results in hundreds of pending cases caused Marion Merrill Dow to permanently stop
production of Bendectin after numerous tests by government agencies in several countries
indicated it was safe).
33 See BACOW & WHEELER, supra note 32, at 19 (stating that because the negotiators
are stuck with their settlement, they are more likely to consider the details involved in
implementing the settlement than a judge who never sees the dispute after entry of a final
decree).
34 See Thomas, supra note 25, at 438-39.
35 For example, suppose a remedial action plan embodied in a consent decree required
a two-foot compacted clay cover over a contaminated site to prevent percolation of
rainwater through the contaminated zone and into an adjacent aquifer. This decision was
probably made during negotiations after consideration of various factors such as the
permeability of the silt or clay in the area, whether there was an adequate volume of soil to
cover the site, and the site hydrogeologic conditions. If the government agency that entered
the decree comes back three years later and demands that the defendant install a synthetic
liner in addition to the clay cover, the defendant has the consent decree to use as a shield.
While the defendant might ultimately have to install the liner, the agency must overcome the
contract in the court that approved it, and answer questions about why it did not require this
action in the original consent decree.
36 "Not only the parties, but the general public as well, benefit from the saving of time
and money that results from the voluntary settlement of litigation. Thus '[v]oluntary
settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor.'" Citizens for a Better Env't v.
Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d
1197, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 253,
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The incentives to negotiate and form consent decrees must be remembered
when considering Satsky. While the plaintiffs have been careful not to
specifically request modification of the consent decree, many of their requests,
such as medical monitoring, were specifically considered and rejected during
the consent decree negotiations. Furthermore, their contempt for the consent
decree is obvious from public statements of their attorney and comments in
their complaint. By allowing the finality of the consent decree to be seriously
questioned by citizen claims seeking modification, the Tenth Circuit has
reduced the incentive to enter consent decrees and promoted litigation and
delay by responsible parties. This is a step in the wrong direction, and the
doctrines of laches, untimely intervention, and res judicata warrant against the
use of suits like Satsky to undermine the effect of a valid consent decree.
IV. THE AFFIRMATIVE EQUITABLE DEFENSE OF LACHES AND SATSKY
Laches was not considered in Satsky, but it is relevant to this discussion
because in seeking modification of the consent decree, the plaintiffs were
seeking equitable remedies. Laches is a common law equitable defense that is
similar to a statute of limitations. However, it does not apply in a mechanical
manner after a definite time period like the statute of limitations; rather it
applies only when equity so requires. 37 Laches is based on the principle "that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." 38 The
99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 30-32 (1985) (stating that EPA has more authority to settle
under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) because under the
original Superfund law so much money and time was wasted in litigation); Frederick
Anderson, Negotiation and Infornal Agency Action: The Case of Superfund, 1985 DUKE
L.J 261, 287 (stating that EPA prefers consent decrees over other forms of settlement).
37 Although laches promotes many of the same goals as the statute of limitations, the
doctrine is more flexible and requires an assessment of the facts of each case-it is the
reasonableness of the delay rather than the number of years that elapse which is the
focus of the inquiry.
Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 624 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959, opinion
vacated on reh'g, 891 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 937 (1990). Stone is
enlightening when considering the facts in Satsky. In Stone, the plaintiff was the illegitimate
daughter of country singing star Hank Williams, Sr., who claimed she did not bring her
royalties claim until five years after she knew of her rights because she feared
embarrassment and publicity. The court said those fears were legitimate and
understandable, but not sufficient to make the delay reasonable and stop the application of
laches. In Satsky, the plaintiffs appear to have no excuse, much less a strong excuse like that
of the plaintiff in Stone, for bringing this action eight years after the initial suit by the State.
38 NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense and Edue. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985). "[Als in all other petitions for equitable relief, he
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Tenth Circuit and most other courts hold that there are two requirements for
the doctrine to apply: (1) unreasonable or inexcusable delay in bringing an
action, and (2) prejudice to the defendant.39 Laches is to be considered in light
of the facts of the case, 40 and the decision to apply laches is left to the
discretion of the trial court. 4 1
In Satsky, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and indirectly requested
modification of the consent decree.42 They were asking the court to exercise its
equity powers to modify the consent decree when they requested new impact
studies and monitoring plans. 43 Modifying consent decrees is in essence using
equity powers to reform or rescind an otherwise enforceable contract. Because
modification is an equitable claim, the Supreme Court requires those seeking
modification of a consent decree to demonstrate "[n]othing less than a clear
showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions."44
Applying the first element of laches to the Satsky case, unreasonable or
inexcusable delay occurs only after the plaintiff knows or could have known of
who seeks equity must do equity, and the court will be alert to see that its peculiar remedial
process is in no way abused." Koster v. Lumbermans Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
522(1947).
3 9 In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514, 1519 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Brunswick
Corp. v. Spirit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 523 (10th Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 852
(1990); Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F.2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
40 Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
41 "We will not disturb a finding of laches unless the district court abused its
discretion." In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d at 1519. "A district court has discretion to
dismiss an action for laches only if plaintiff 'has unreasonably delayed in [filing suit] and the
delay harmed the defendant.' ... [A] district court may abuse its discretion if it applies an
equitable standard incorrectly." Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1987)
(citation omitted).
42 Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993).
Regarding the contention that the plaintiffs sought modification of the consent decree, see
supra note 20 and accompanying text. Plaintiff also sought $300 million for property
damages even though "[tihe damages caused by intrusion of hazardous substances from the
Eagle Mine onto the surrounding property were considered in the Consent Decree in
Paramount L" Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 511 (D.
Colo. 1991), rev'd, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993). Further evidence that plaintiffs were
really after a modification of the consent decree is their comment that "the consent decree is
not worth the paper it's written on." Paramount Argues Eagle Mine Suit, supra note 4, at
1041.
43 The citizens' disdain for the consent decree is evidenced by the court of appeals'
comment that "[p]laintiffs contend that the activities which took place as a result of the
consent decree had a disastrous effect upon the Eagle River and the surrounding
community." Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1467.
44 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
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facts that established a cause of action.45 Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot
claim ignorance of the law in this regard. 46 In Satsky, the first complaint was
filed by the State in 1983, more than seven years before the plaintiffs filed the
class action suit. It is likely that at least some of the plaintiffs participated in the
investigations and negotiations that led to the consent decree. In addition, the
mine is in a rural area where it is probable that most of the class action
plaintiffs were made aware of the proceedings by word of mouth or local
media. Thus, it can be said that the plaintiffs knew of the facts giving rise to
their causes of action well before 1990. Considering the statute of limitations
on most tort-like causes of action is in the range of two or three years, it is fair
to say that it was unreasonable or inexcusable for the plaintiffs to refrain from
bringing suit until eight years after they had reason to know of their causes of
action.
Turning to the second element of laches, the courts have recognized
defense prejudice and economic prejudice as two broad types of prejudice to
consider when analyzing laches issues.47 Furthermore, "[w]hen the plaintiff's
45 "An inexcusable or unreasonable delay may occur only after the plaintiff discovers
or with reasonable diligence could have discovered the facts giving rise to his [or her] cause
of action." White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260
(1991). The courts have applied laches to lapses of various lengths in many different
contexts. See, e.g., In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding a 20-
month lapse unreasonable in bankruptcy case); NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense and
Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir.) (finding a 13-year lapse to be unreasonable in
an action for trademark infringement), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985); Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Elees. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding an 11-year lapse to be
unreasonable in an action for trademark infringement and unfair competition), cet. denied,
368 U.S. 820 (1961); Seven-Up Co. v. O-So-Grape, Co., 283 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1960)
(finding a 13-year lapse to be unreasonable in an action for trademark infringement and
unfair competition), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Bailey v. United States, 171 F.
Supp. 281 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (finding a lapse of four years and five months unreasonable in an
action to recover back pay).
46 Knowledge of the law is imputed, and claimed or legitimate ignorance of a right
does not justify delay in filing suit. Jones v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 531, 533 (1984).
47 Defense prejudice includes loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading
memories, or unavailability of witnesses. Economic prejudice focuses on the monetary
consequences of allowing the plaintiff to prevail. Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372,
1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988). To place a figure on economic prejudice, the Supreme Court has
held that the federal government would suffer economic prejudice if plaintiff prevailed on
his claims for two years of back pay from the military. United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane,
249 U.S. 367, 372 (1919); see also Bailey, 171 F. Supp. at 281 (holding the monetary
consequences of losing on a claim for four years and five months of back pay was
sufficiently prejudicial to support application of laches).
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conduct is unjustified, the defendant's need to show prejudice eases." 48 The
prejudice can arise from outside circumstances-such as Paramount's
agreement to be bound by the consent decree-during the period the plaintiffs
were sitting on their rights.49 It is helpful to note that the Tenth Circuit has said
laches is just another name for equitable estoppel.50 Thus, for prejudice to be
sufficient to invoke the laches defense, the court must find that the defendant
reasonably relied on the plaintiff's inaction and detrimentally altered its
position.51
The consent decree at issue in Satsky was approved by the district court
only after extensive public comment was received. In fact, Stuart and Wendy
Satsky submitted comments which were considered by the court and the
Colorado Department of Health.52 However, it appears that no citizens brought
claims against Paramount until two years after the consent decree was filed. It
is arguable whether Paramount could "reasonably" rely on the constructive
actions and lack of offensive action by the citizens to form a belief that signing
a consent decree would end the case once and for all. Paramount clearly altered
its position by agreeing to pay millions in cleanup costs and fines and binding
themselves to a fifteen-year plan. Paramount now has implemented the remedial
action plan for five years at a cost in excess of twenty-five million dollars and
voluntarily incurred other costs. 53 The Supreme Court has held that forcing the
federal government to reimburse two years of a discharged employee's pay was
sufficient economic prejudice to invoke laches. 54 With this as a backdrop, it
seems unquestionable that forcing Paramount to change directions and start
over on a multimillion dollar cleanup plan which is one-third complete would
be substantially more prejudicial. This prejudice, coupled with the lower level
of prejudice that is required once unreasonable delay has been shown, warrants
a finding that laches bars the citizens' claims to the extent they seek
modification of matters resolved by the consent decree.
48 In re Centric Corp., 901 F.2d at 1520.
49 Id.
50 Central Improvement Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., 210 F. 696, 713 (10th Cir. 1913),
aft'd, 240 U.S. 166 (1916).
51 Something more than mere inconvenience is necessary. Bennett v. Tucker, 827
F.2d 63, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1987).52 Answer Brief of Appellee Paramount Communications, Inc., at 2, Satsky v.
Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1037).
53 Id. at 3 n.3. Paramount has voluntarily relocated drinking water wells for the town
of Mintum. aeanup of Metal Contamination to Cost $17M for Eagle River, State Env't
Daily (BNA) (Apr. 6, 1993).
54 See United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 372 (1919).
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V. ANALYZING SATsKYAS AN INTERVENTION CASE
Citizen groups and environmental "public interest" groups occasionally
seek intervention in actions between the government and a polluter under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 and "citizen suit" provisions in
environmental statutes. 55 Rule 24 provides two methods of intervention:
intervention of right56  and permissive intervention.57  Citizens and
environmental groups seeking intervention in an action between the government
and a polluter prefer the former method.58 One reason for this preference is
that judges might exercise the discretion provided in the latter method59 to
block intervention that would be counterproductive to resolution of the original
claim.60 A second reason these parties prefer intervention of right is that they
believe they have interests that will be impaired or neglected unless they are
made parties. 61 Thus, public interest groups intervene not to conserve judicial
resources62 but for the noble purposes of representing other citizens who are
already represented by government attorneys,63 implementing their beliefs of
what constitutes proper environmental policy.64
55 See infra note 108 for further discussion of these "citizen suit" provisions.
56 FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a).
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
58 Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 57 U. CHu. L. REv. 279, 283 (1990).
59 "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." FED. R.
Civ. P. 24(b).
60 Vreeland, supra note 58, at 283.
61 Id.
62 Id. Note that Rule 24(a) is generally viewed as an equitable provision that allows
outsiders to protect rights that will be affected by ongoing litigation, while Rule 24(b) is
generally viewed as a judicial economy provision that allows a court to tie up the loose ends
of an action in one more complex suit rather than several subsequent two-party actions. Id.
63 In some cases, the government representatives will even urge the court to deny the
environmentalist and citizen groups intervention because the government is adequately
representing the nonparties' interests. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics
Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 987 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying intervention to environmental groups
from the United States and Canada after the United States, Province of Ontario, State of
New York, and City of Niagara Falls "vigorously" asserted their adequacy of representation
of citizens on both sides of the border).
64 The Second Circuit, stating this conclusion in a politically acceptable manner while
denying several environmental groups a right to intervene, said:
The government and the private intervenor may differ over both the standard of liability
and the proper remedy. The diversion of time and resources as well as the risk that a
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With the foregoing in mind-and little authority for doing so-it is
beneficial to view Satsky as if it were an intervention claim by a citizen
group. 65 It makes sense to do this because claims raised by the Satsky plaintiffs
regard the same transaction and underlying facts as the claims represented by
the State. What the plaintiffs in Satsky are seeking, in addition to compensation
for alleged injuries, is a modification or reformation of the consent decree. 66
This new action is functionally equivalent to intervening late in the negotiations
and seeking terms more favorable to the intervenor by threatening not to
consent, thus, blocking entry of the consent decree which was worked out
among other parties to the negotiations. Furthermore, this de facto form of
court will err in evaluating the positions of the [EPA] Administrator and the intervenor
on technological and scientific questions at the outer limits of a court's competence
dictates the need to require a strong showing of inadequacy of representation before
impairing the Administrator's control over the litigation.
Hooker, 749 F.2d at 989. A distorted environmental policy would exist if citizens and
environmentalists were allowed to intervene at will in environmental disputes and
implement an agenda different from that of the government. Thus, courts tend to require
would-be intervenors to make a "very compelling showing" when one of the parties in a
case is the government. Id. at 987; see 3B JAMES W. MOORE & JOHN E. KENNEDY,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrCE 24.07[41, at 24-76 to 24-79 (1993).
65 Some courts have discussed barring a subsequent action by a nonparty to the
original action for a failure to intervene. See, e.g., Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114 (1968) ("[It might be argued that [a purportedly
indispensible party] should be bound by the previous decision because, although technically
a nonparty, he had purposely by-passed an adequate opportunity to intervene."); Penn-
Central Merger and N.W. Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 505-06 (1968) (discussing the
opportunity to intervene and its preclusive effects); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 744
F.2d 963, 968-72 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding upon narrow facts that where a separate action
filed seven months after entry of the consent decree attacking the terms of that decree was
not maintainable where NWF knew of the negotiations, knew their interests were at stake,
monitored the negotiations closely, chose not to intervene until late in the proceedings, and
chose not to appeal a denial of intervention); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d
1045 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding "an unjustified or unreasonable failure to intervene can serve
to bar a later collateral attack.... Mhese [plaintiffs] should not be allowed to escape the
consequences of their own tardiness by recasting their motion for intervention as a
complaint in a suit collaterally attacking the prior judgment."); Western Shoshone Legal
Defense & Educ. Ass'n v. United States, 531 F.2d 495, 502 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 885 (1976); see also 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 4452, at 439 (characterizing
the principle as "new and tentative"). But cf. Chase Nat'l Bank v. City of Norwalk, 291
U.S. 431, 441 (1934) (stating that a nonparty has no duty to intervene); see also 18 WRIGrr
Lrr AL., supra note 22, § 4452, at 446.
66 Brief for Amici Curiae for the State of Colorado at 2-3, Satsky v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1037).
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intervention relieves the citizens of their heavy burden of proving that the
government is not an adequate representative. 67 Viewed as an untimely
intervention claim, the Satsky case represents a more flagrant attempt to block a
consent decree because it did not come on the eve of entry of the decree, 68 but
more than two years later.
Applicants for intervention must demonstrate four things: (1) that they have
a direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation, (2) that
their ability to protect that interest may be impaired if they are not allowed to
intervene, (3) that their interest will not be adequately represented by an
existing party, and (4) that the motion to intervene is timely.69 For purposes of
analyzing Satsky, the first two elements can quickly be established by the
plaintiffs' continued interest throughout the negotiations and the damage to
their property that may go unreimbursed if they are not permitted to intervene.
However, the Satsky plaintiffs have trouble meeting the third and fourth
elements of the intervention doctrine.
In terms of adequacy of representation, citizen plaintiffs occasionally claim
that the government sold them out and did not adequately represent their
interests.70 But these individuals come with interests that are often adverse to
those of the State and adverse to those of at least a considerable number of
citizens. The plaintiffs in Satsky deserve compensation for damages to their
private property, but in terms of injunctive and punitive relief, they were
adequately represented in the consent decree that embodied a remediation plan
and extracted penalties for polluting that began in 1916. As one court was
67 It also avoids the situation where the government seeks to block the citizens from
intervening. The plaintiffs in Sarsky could not have had it better. First the State collected
damages from Paramount for injury to property around the site, none of which was owned
by the State. Then the State flip-flopped in its amicus brief saying "[tihe State did not
purport to, nor can it, represent the purely private interests of its citizens who may be
injured, in their persons or their property, by these releases." Brief for Amici Curiae for the
State of Colorado at 5, Satsky (No. 92-1037). One is left to wonder whether the State would
have taken the same position during the negotiations if the citizens had sought intervention.
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
68 See, e.g., Gorsuch, 744 F.2d at 965-66, 969-70 (upholding the denial of
intervention as untimely where NWF was aware of case, chose to act "behind the scenes,"
and filed an amicus brief before making a motion to intervene a month before final judicial
approval of a consent decree).6 9 International Paper Co. v. Inhabitants of Jay, 887 F.2d 338, 342 (lst Cir. 1989).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 973 (2d
Cir. 1984) (Environmentalists seeking intervenion claimed that the United States, State of
New York, and City of Niagara Falls "refused to deal seriously" with a proposal to abandon
the city's existing drinking water plant and construct a new one at an uncontaminated
location.).
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quick to point out, "[t]he mere existence of disagreement over some aspects of
the remediation necessary to abate the hazard does not demonstrate a lack of
capacity on the part of the government... to represent its constituents fairly
and faithfully." 71 The presence of intervenors with an antagonistic attitude can
slow the negotiations to a standstill because the intervenors will be satisfied
with nothing less than an agreement to "overclean" their community. In Satsky,
the experts at the EPA had conducted numerous tests and had reliable estimates
as to what was required to make the area safe. Thus, the interests of the
citizens are adequately represented when a consent decree commands cleaning
of the environment down to levels determined by government officials.
As was discussed in Part IV regarding laches, timeliness of the attack on a
consent decree also should have been a factor considered by the Tenth Circuit
in Satsky. The cleanup operations at the Eagle Mine have been going on under
the consent decree for five years. But now the plaintiffs want to change the
rules of the game. They want to force Paramount to do more than it bargained
for and more than the government demanded when it represented all citizens in
its parens patriae capacity. Timeliness determinations require consideration of
all the circumstances, 72 and three factors in particular: "how far the
proceedings have gone when the movant seeks to intervene, prejudice which
resultant delay might cause to other parties, and the reason for the delay. "73 In
applying the first factor to Satsky, the court would have to consider how far the
cleanup has progressed rather than how far the proceedings have gone. As for
the second factor, the prejudice caused by the delay would be to the taxpayers
and citizens of Colorado. Paramount has spent five years and millions of
dollars to remediate the site under State supervision, but if the plaintiffs can
have the consent decree modified there will be further delay and more pollution
while the parties retrace steps taken years ago. The added delay and pollution
comes at the expense of all citizens being affected by the pollution.
Focusing on the third factor in the timeliness evaluation, there appears to
be no clear reason for the delay in this situation. The plaintiffs waited in the
wings to file suit, all the while knowing what was going on in the State's case.
It is left to speculation why the plaintiffs waited so long, but few "legitimate"
reasons can be given for the delay. The facts and investigation of the situation
were available for almost eight years by the time the plaintiffs finally filed suit.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs had participated at public hearings and through the
comment mechanism provided under CERCLA before entry of the consent
71 Hooker, 749 F.2d at 987.
72 NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973); Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d
1295, 1316 (8th Cir. 1988).
73 Jenkins, 855 F.2d at 1316 (quoting Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303, 305 (8th Cir.
1975)).
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decree.
If the claims of the Satsky plaintiffs that seek modification of the consent
decree are viewed essentially as claims for intervention, there is considerable
reason to deny them from proceeding. Had the plaintiffs sought this relief
through a motion to intervene a month before the decree was entered, the court
would most likely have had to deny it because the plaintiffs could not show
inadequacy of representation. In addition, the plaintiffs had no valid reason for
their untimeliness. The resultant delay from allowing intervention would have
caused substantial prejudice to the State and Paramount on the eve of entering
the decree. The reality is that the plaintiffs did not intervene a month before the
consent decree was signed; rather, they waited for two years while Paramount
poured millions of dollars into a remediation plan that the plaintiffs participated
in creating.
VI. RES JUDICATA AND THE SATSKYCONSENT DECREE
As a general rule, res judicata applies to consent decrees to the extent the
parties74 intended the consent decree to be preclusive. 75 For res judicata to
apply there must be: (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior action, (2)
claims of the prior action identical to the claims in the subsequent action, and
(3) the same parties or their privies involved in both actions.76 Consent decrees
meet the first element of the res judicata doctrine with little difficulty because
they are generally assumed to be valid final judgments on the merits unless the
parties specify otherwise in the decree itself.77 This is somewhat surprising
because the parties have resolved the substantive issues in negotiations rather
than an adversarial process, yet the parties' resolution of the issues-as
74 In most environmental consent decrees, as was the case in Satsky, there are three
parties that may be affected by the res judicata effect of the consent decree: defendants,
private citizens, and the government.
75 "A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some
respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect
will be reflected in and be enforceable as a judicial decree that is subject to the rules
generally applicable to other judgments and decrees." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 757 (1992). "The basically contractual nature of consent judgments has
led to general agreement that preclusive effects should be measured by the intent of the
parties." 18 WRIGHT T A.., supra note 22, § 4443, at 384.
76 Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993).
77 "In most circumstances, it is recognized that consent agreements ordinarily are
intended to preclude any further litigation on any of the issues presented. Thus, consent
judgments ordinarily support claim preclusion but not issue preclusion." 18 WRIGHT ar" AL.,
supra note 22, § 4443, at 384-85; see also supra note 75.
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opposed to the court's final ruling-is binding on future litigation. 78 Thus,
while a judge does review the consent decree before entry, usually the parties
determine whether they will be precluded in future actions. 79 The consent
decree at issue in Satsky met this first requirement by stating "that settlement
and entry of this Consent Decree is made in good faith to avoid expensive and
protracted litigation and to finally settle and resolve all claims between the
parties which have been raised by the State's complaint."80
A. Satsky and the Second Requirement of the Res Judicata Doctrine:
Identity of Claims
In analyzing the second element of the res judicata doctrine, the Tenth
Circuit follows the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments to determine what is a claim arising from the "same cause of
action." 81 Under this approach, when res judicata precludes any part of the
subsequent plaintiffs claim, it precludes all other rights that the plaintiff has
against the defendant stemming from "the transaction, or series of connected
transactions, out of which the action arose." 82 In determining what is a
7 8 The trial court in approving a settlement need not inquire into the precise legal rights
of the parties nor reach and resolve the merits of the claims or controversy, but need
only determine that the settlement is fair... and appropriate under the particular facts
and that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties.
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014
(7th Cir. 1980)) (citing as authority in accord Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S.
79, 88 n.14 (1981)), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975), cer. denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976);
United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Franks v.
Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216, 1224 (6th Cir. 1981)); see also 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
22, § 4443, at 383.
79 Webster, supra note 22, at 142 (stating that generally the court review of a consent
decree amounts to slightly more than a "rubber stamp").80 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1468 (emphasis added and emphasis in original).
81 Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th
Cir. 1989); Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 508 (D. Colo.
1991), rev'd, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993). This is the modern approach advocated by the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL
Er AL., CIVIL PRoCEDURE § 14.4 (1985) (The authors explain that the transactional theory is
based on maximizing judicial efficiency while maintaining justice. The authors go on to
explain several other theories the courts have used, including a popular approach that looks
at whether the nature of the right or the injury is the same in both actions.).82 Lowell Staats, 878 F.2d at 1274 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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"transaction" and what is a "series," the Restatement directs courts to be
pragmatic and give weight to various factors such as relation in time, space,
origin, or motivation; whether the issues form a convenient trial unit; and
whether their treatment as a unit meets the expectations of the parties. 83
The transactional approach to the res judicata doctrine is difficult to apply
in most cases, 84 but in Satsky, the court did not even discuss the doctrine. 85 In
the initial action between Colorado and Paramount, the State, suing to protect
its quasi-sovereign interests, claimed CERCLA violations, CERCLA response
costs, strict liability, and negligence. 86 The plaintiffs in Satsky, suing to protect
their quasi-private interests, also claimed CERCLA violations, CERCLA
response costs, strict liability, and negligence. 87 In both actions, the claims
§ 24(1) (1982)).
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUIxMETS § 24(2) (1982); see also Lowell Staats, 878
F.2d at 1274.84 The difficulty is that the court must determine not just what was litigated previously
but also what might have been litigated, and "[tlo ask what might have been litigated in a
former action is, in Professor Cleary's words, to 'leave the workaday world and enter into a
wondrous realm of words.'" FR]EDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 81, § 14.3 (quoting Edward
W. Cleary, Res Judhicata Reexamned, 57 YALE L.i. 339, 343 (1948)). All that can be said
with certainty is that "identical conplaints raise the same cause of action and claims arising
from different transactions or occurrences are distinct causes of action." Id. (emphasis
added).
85 After stating that the three elements of res judicata are "(1) a final judgment on the
merits in the prior suit; (2) the prior suit involved identical claims as the claims in the
present suit; and (3) the prior suit involved the same parties or their privies..." and saying
"we turn now to an examination of each element," the court considers the "Final Judgment
on the Merits" in part A of the opinion and "Identity of Parties" in part B and never
considers identity of claims. Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464,
1467-68 (10th Cir. 1993). This missing discussion is probably because the parties' main
contentions centered around the two issues of finality of the consent decree and privity of
the parties. Furthermore, if there is no privity of parties, identity of claims is irrelevant. The
court holds not that there is no privity, but that there might be privity on some claims and
not others. The defect in the reasoning is that the court never considers how that holding
affects the transactional approach, which in essence says that if some claims are barred, all
claims coming from that transaction are barred. Fortunately, the Restatement and the
commentators have provided insight in this area.
86 See id. at 1467.
87 Id. While the CERCLA claims should have been barred by res judicata, an
additional reason to bar them is the holding of the Supreme Court that citizen suit provisions
are intended to "supplement rather than supplant governmental action." Gwaltney of
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60 (1987). The State of
Colorado had brought a CERCLA action and settled it with a consent decree that required
"extensive remedial activities, including removal, containment, and monitoring of the Eagle
1000 [Vol. 55:983
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arose from the same operative facts and circumstances that occurred at the
Eagle Mine. 88 The contamination at issue in both actions is related in time, and
identical in space, origin, and motivation. 89 Furthermore, the issues form a
convenient trial unit because the same theories, evidence, and defenses are
fundamental in both actions. 90 Thus, there is a strong reason to believe that
when viewed pragmatically, the claims in both actions arose out of the same
transaction.
Mines site and surrounding area and water supplies." Satsky v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 505, 511 (D. Colo. 1991), rev'd, 7 F.3d 1464 (10th
Cir. 1993).
88 There is some complexity here as well because the Satsky plaintiffs are claiming
damages for contamination to date, which would include contamination before and after
entry of the consent decree. Nonetheless, the contamination was an ongoing transaction, and
entering of the consent decree should not end one transaction and create a second. If this
were not so, the plaintiffs could say they were simply suing on the contamination that
occurred after entry of the consent decree and res judicata would be irrelevant because
those would be claims based on a different "transaction."
89 See Aliff v. joy Mfg. Co., 914 F.2d 39 (4th Cir. 1990). In Ai f, the court was
dealing with a second action between the same parties to the first action that involved a
contaminated building. The court held the plaintiffs newly raised claims under CERCLA
were barred by res judicata. In determining whether the claims arose from the same
transaction, the court said:
Th'ere is no simple test to determine what constitutes the same cause of action for res
judicata purposes.... [We believe Aliff's CERCLA claim could have been brought in
Aiff I because it arises from the same factual basis, namely the contaminated
building.... Aliff possessed sufficient evidence to construct a CERCLA theory of
recovery in Aliff I.... Mhe jury in the first trial considered the issues of
contamination, the cleanup, and their effects on the value of the building.
Id. at 43.
These same elements were present in Satsky. The factual basis in Satsky was a
contaminated mine rather than a building. If the plaintiffs had sought intervention, they had
the evidence to bring their claims, and the State had already constructed several theories of
recovery for their quasi-sovereign interests. Most importantly, the essence of the consent
decree was to consider the contamination and the cleanup of the mine and surrounding areas
and to weigh the effects of the contamination and cleanup on surrounding areas and the
natural resources of the state.
90 Note that the nuisance claims are different because the State could not sue for
private nuisance, and the citizens could not sue for statutory nuisance. See W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 90 (5th ed. 1984). The
plaintiffs can bring the CERCLA response cost claims, even though the State has brought
such claims, as long as the costs are consistent with the national contingency plan.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 107(a)(4)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988).
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Herein lies the complexity of the case. The transaction approach says "a
final judgment extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff [or their
privies]... against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the
transaction, or series of connected transactions out of which the action
arose." 91 But in Satsky, the Tenth Circuit held that some of the plaintiffs'
claims where the State had standing to sue are barred but other "purely private
interests are not." 92 This flies in the face of the all-or-nothing nature of the
transaction approach. The solution to this dilemma can be found in the
comments to the Restatement, where the drafters state that the authority of
government representatives to litigate on behalf of a few or all citizens is of two
types: "exclusive authority" and "coexistent authority." 93 When the authority
of the representative is exclusive, citizens have no standing to sue.94 When the
authority is coexistent, the complexity increases substantially. The threshold
question to ask is whether the official's exercise of the coexistent authority
"preempts" the citizens from pursuing otherwise available private actions. 95 If
the authority is preemptive, whatever result the government reaches in its
action is binding on the citizens. 96 If instead of being preemptive, the
representative's authority is "supplemental" in relation to the individual's
rights, the result obtained by the representative will not bind the citizen from
bringing his or her own claim. 97 This is another way of describing what is
essentially a continuum with purely public rights which citizens cannot exercise
on one extreme, purely private rights which the government cannot exercise on
the other, and rights that both citizens and government might have standing to
raise in the middle.98
In trying to place claims of citizens at some point on the continuum, two
91 Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th
Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEmET (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs § 24(2)).
92 Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993);
see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 cmt. d (1982). Note that the
transactional approach is reproduced at § 24. Comment (e) to § 24 deals with nonparties
and refers to § 41. Section 41(1)(d) and comment (d) deal with preclusion of nonparties
when represented by government representatives.
94 RESTATEMEMN (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTs § 41 cmt. d (1982). An example would be
a criminal law or civil law under which citizens have no cause of action.
95 Id. An example of this type of situation would be the citizen suit provisions of many
environmental statutes where citizen actions are preempted when the government is
diligently pursuing a case against the defendant. See infra note 108 for further discussion of
citizen suits.
96 RESTATE ENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 cmt. d (1982).
97 Id.
98 See 18 WiGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 4458, at 513.
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guideposts are suggested. First, in determining whether an individual right is
bound by State action, "a great deal turns on measuring the intended
importance of individual enforcement rights." 99 Second, the tendency should
be not to preclude "traditional common law claims or private remedies
expressly created by statute" because of prior governmental action. 10
Satsky has crash-landed across the continuum. The court said that "[t]he
extent to which the plaintiffs are barred, turns on the nature of the rights
asserted by them." 10' Consider, for example, the interests claimed by the
flyfishing associations and rafting companies. To the extent their claims are
based on damage to natural resources, such as the fish population, they appear
to be toward the public right extreme, because those interests are held by all
citizens but actionable only by the State. But one can say the claims are based
on lost profits because the companies lost fishers and rafters due to a reduced
fish population, and now the interests appear closer to the private right
extreme. However, one could just as easily say the interest of these groups is
that they cannot eat the fish from the river because they might contain high
levels of heavy metals, and that interest seems to fall somewhere in the middle.
With this one small portion of the Satsky claims, one can see the complex and
purely subjective nature of a court's determination of the private rights
involved in this case.
The focus of this Case Comment is primarily on the protection that should
be given to a consent decree. In Colorado's action that resulted in the consent
decree, the State was acting in its parens patriae capacity to protect sovereign
and quasi-sovereign interests.102 Thus, any of the citizens' claims that result in
modification of the consent decree are seeking vindication of the same
sovereign or quasi-sovereign rights and should be barred be res judicata. While
the "preemptive" versus "supplemental" distinction does little to further this
proposition, the guideposts are more helpful. Under the first guidepost, the
citizens' claims that would change the consent decree cannot be very important
individual enforcement rights because the State has already enforced them
through the consent decree. While there is a tendency against preclusion of
common law claims under the second guidepost, the citizens' claims based on
99 Id. at 514 (citing Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689
(1961), a case involving coincidental federal and individual interests in an antitrust case, for
the proposition that intensely private rights should not be precluded by government action).
100 18 WRIGTrr ET AL., supra note 22, § 4458, at 515 (citing as an example Northern
Va. Women's Medical Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045, 1050 (4th Cir. 1980), in which the
clinic was allowed to restrain trespasses on its property even though the State had dropped
criminal prosecutions for past trespasses).
101 Satsky v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993).
10 2 See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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CERCLA, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability have long been the theories
used by the government in environmental cases. The State is not stealing
individual's claims; rather it is simply more efficient to prosecute one
negligence or nuisance claim rather than thousands. In the end, all that can be
said is that the courts must be alert to apply res judicata when there are
attempts to alter consent decrees through the use of seemingly private claims.
This discussion highlights the difficulty that exists in determining when those
seemingly private claims are really public.
B. Satsky and the Third Requirement of the Res Judicata Doctrine:
Parties and Their Privies
In cases involving governmental parties, determining "privity" for
purposes of the third element of the res judicata doctrine has posed significant
problems. "There is no definition of 'privity' which can be automatically
applied to all cases involving the doctrines of res judicata ... ."103 Privity
exists when the interests of a party are so connected with the interests of a
nonparty that a decision for or against the party should control the rights of the
nonparty. 104 To analyze privity problems, commentators suggest that the courts
should determine whether the facts and circumstances underlying the initial
action support a presumption that the nonparty's interest was adequately
represented. 10 5 To determine whether there was adequate representation when
the government is a party to the initial action, the role of parens patriae
standing must be considered.
1. Parens Patriae Standing
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the State has standing to sue on
behalf of all its citizens "to prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign'
interests." 1°6 But the State cannot sue on claims that are purely private and
103 Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1468 (quoting Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec.
Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1989)).
104 FRiEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 81, § 14.13. When privity exists, it is presumed
that the party adequately represented the interests of the nonparty because it was in the
party's best interests to do so. Id.
105 Id.
106 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 258 (1972). The Supreme
Court has held that States have quasi-sovereign interests in the general health and well-
being-both physical and economic-of its citizens. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
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held by individual citizens. 10 7 These descriptions of the parens patriae doctrine
are useless in a case like Satsky because there are seemingly identical claims
that both the government and the citizens have standing to bring.108 In these
cases where the government has acted on behalf of the public, the privity and
identical claims elements of the res judicata doctrine are inextricably
intertwined. Thus, when considering parens patriae privity one must examine
where asserted claims fall on the continuum of private and public rights.
2. Parens Patiae and Privity in Satsky
In its amicus brief, Colorado said it acted in its quasi-sovereign capacity in
the initial action. 1°9 Thus, it was also representing quasi-private interests of the
citizens, such as an interest in the natural resources of the state and safe
drinking water. When it comes to these "quasi" interests, the theories and
beliefs of the State and the citizens are very similar. It is an arguable, if not
necessary, conclusion that these interests are so connected that a decision for or
against the State should control the rights of the citizens. 110 In other words,
107 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 600 (stating that if a State is nothing
more than a nominal party with no interests of its own, it does not have parens patriae
standing); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976) (stating that it is "settled
doctrine that a State has standing to sue [in its parens patriae capacity] only when its
sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a
volunteer the personal claims of its citizens"); Satsky, 7 F.3d at 1469. See supra part VI.A
for a discussion of the difficulty in determining what is a private claim.
108 For example, in Satsky and the original action by the State, theories of negligence
and strict liability in tort were pursued by both the State and the class action plaintiffs.
CERCLA, the law upon which the government often bases its claims against polluters, can
also be used by citizens (in fact the Satsky plaintiffs claimed CERCLA violations). 42
U.S.C. § 9659 (1988). However, Congress has considered the problem of two identical
claims being brought against a polluter and provided preemption and intervention as a
matter of right for the government when a citizen commences such an action. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659(d), (e), & (g) (1988). Note that a similar statutory scheme is followed in many other
environmental laws. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988) (roxic Substance Control Act
(TSCA) citizen suit provision); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) citizen suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988) (Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) citizen suit provision); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988) (Clean Air Act of
1990 (CAA) citizen suit provision).
109 Brief for Amici Curiae for the State of Colorado at 11-12, Satsky v. Paramount
Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464 (10th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1037). The State then adds,
"A state's quasi-sovereign interests are generally relied on as the basis for a state's suit to
abate environmental pollution." Id. (citing Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900)).
110 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
19941 1005
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
privity exists between the State and the citizens when the State acts in its parens
patriae position representing quasi-sovereign interests because the interests of
the State and the citizens are substantially the same.
When analyzing privity problems, the courts are directed to look at
adequacy of representation in the initial action, 111 for equity requires that a
nonparty not be bound when their interests were not adequately represented in
the initial action. 112 However, when the State is a party to an action, there is a
presumption of adequate representation of the citizens' claims that could be
brought by the government as well.1 13 When citizen groups seek intervention
in government actions, courts often address the issue of adequate representation
by the government. 114 The trend in that regard has generally been to find
inadequacy of representation in only limited instances. 115 Thus, there is a
strong presumption that the quasi-sovereign/quasi-private rights common to all
citizens are adequately represented when the government takes action against a
polluter.
Turning now to Satsky, the State appears to have adequately represented
the citizens in its parens patriae capacity. There is also evidence that the privity
requirement in the environmental context is to be tested by a lower standard
111 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
112 United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 1304 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
113 See 7C CHARLES A. W icHT ET AL., FEDiERAL PRAcricE AND PRocEDuRE § 1909,
at 324-37 & nn.19-28 (1982). The text of this section states:
[In] cases in which the interest of the absentee is identical with that of one of the existing
parties or there is a party charged by law with representing the interest of the
absentee,. . representation will be presumed adequate unless special circumstances
are shown. A typical example is a class action, in which all the members of the class
have precisely the same interest. This principle applies when ... a governmental body
or officer is the named party. Thus, for example, in the absence of a very compelling
showing to the contrary, it will be assumed that the United States adequately represents
the public interest in antitrust suits, in school desegregation cases, and in a variety of
other matters, [and] that a state adequately represents the interests of its citizens ....
Id. (emphasis added).
114 See supra part V; United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d
968, 983-92 (2d Cir. 1984) (denying intervention to four environmental groups with
members on both sides of the Niagara River in an action by the United States and the State
of New York joined by the Province of Ontario against Hooker Chemicals and the City of
Niagara Falls because the governmental units were adequately representing the interests of
each group); Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. at 1306-07 (denying plaintiffs' claims that they were
inadequately represented by the United States because of a conflict of interest on the part of
the government, which represented various agencies, including those that owned the
property that had been leased to Olin and subsequently contaminated).
115 See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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that is more apt to find privity to exist.116 Finally, privity is generally
understood as a matter of fact, and the district court determination is to be
overturned only when clearly erroneous.117 Under the traditional meaning of
the word then, there is substantial privity between the State and the plaintiffs.
C. Conclusion on the Res Judicata Doctrine
The Tenth Circuit appears to have replaced the privity-plus-identity-of-
claims test for res judicata with what amounts to a test to determine whether the
claims of the citizens are similar to the claims of the State. The problem with
such a test is that determining what is a similar interest is almost entirely
subjective. To ask the question begs the answer. For a prime example, one
need look no further than Satsky itself. The district court generally thought the
action of the citizens was based on several claims that were identical to the
State's claims and barred them all. Meanwhile, the court of appeals thought
otherwise. Regardless of how complex and subjective the gray areas of res
judicata may be, courts should be alert to attempts to modify a consent decree
and prevent such attempts unless there is a clear reason against such action.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Satsky is not a peculiar case presenting a unique fact pattern.
Environmental defendants seeking finality in their actions must heed the
warning that this case sends out. When it comes to a collateral attempt by
citizens to modify a consent decree between the government and a polluter, the
polluter should consider laches, the intervention analysis, and res judicata
effects discussed in this Case Comment. Needless to say, the effectiveness of
these defenses, especially the res judicata defense, is anything but clear.
116 David Sive, Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Environmental Litigation,
C637 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CouRsE OF STuDY: ENVTrL. LrrmG. 1269, 1276-82 (discussing "virtual
representation" and stating, "[i]n essence, it appears to be clear in the federal courts that
one advocate of an environmental interest will not be permitted to stand by and sue on the
same claims as those of another party who has sued, if the claims were adequately presented
by the first party in the first action, even if the two parties are not privies in the tradhtional
sense" (emphasis added)); see Sierra Club v. Block, 576 F. Supp. 959, 966 (D. Or. 1983)
(applying virtual representation theory to bar private plaintiffs from litigating NEPA issues
already determined in an agency action).117 Hooker, 749 F.2d at 990-92.
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